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The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions After
the Civil Rights Act of 1991
Daniel F. Piar ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, employment discrimination class actions have become well-publicized, high-stakes events.1 Enormous monetary exposures, sensational allegations, and aggressive litigation tactics have
brought these cases to prominence in legal circles, the business
community, and the public eye. There are signs, however, that this
trend could be slowed or even halted by a ten-year-old civil rights
law whose implications in this area are just beginning to be felt in the
federal courts.
Employment discrimination class actions are typically brought
under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. As initially passed,
the 1964 Act provided only equitable relief to victims of employment discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 expanded these
remedies by providing compensatory and punitive damages to victims of intentional discrimination in the workplace. The 1991 Act
also bestowed the right to a jury trial on both parties in such cases.
Ironically, however, the same law that was designed to provide
additional remedies to individuals may have made it more difficult
for them to bring class claims. The availability of substantial monetary damages to Title VII plaintiffs may destroy the homogeneity of
remedy required to maintain a class action under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23(b)(2), a concern that was not present when injunctive relief was the predominant remedy under the statute. The
individualized issues of proof and liability raised by the availability of
damages may destroy the commonality necessary to maintain a class

∗ J.D., Yale Law School, 1994; Kilpatrick Stockton LLP, Atlanta, Georgia. The views
expressed in this Article are those of the author, and are not necessarily those of Kilpatrick
Stockton LLP or its clients.
1. See David McNaughton, The Lawyer Taking on Coke: Cyrus Mehri Looks for a “Public
Dimension,” in This Case, Race Relations in the United States, ATLANTA J. & CONST., May 2,
1999, at P-1.
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action under Rule 23(b)(3) and may render other means of adjudication superior to a class action within the meaning of the Rule. And
the availability of a jury trial under Title VII may raise Seventh
Amendment bars to the bifurcation schemes that were traditionally
used to manage class claims of discrimination. As one court has
summarized, “Certification of many Title VII cases as class actions
may no longer be appropriate, given the expanded damages now
made available under Title VII by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.”2
This Article will examine the ways in which the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 has altered the landscape of Title VII class actions and will
analyze the ways in which courts have attempted—with varying degrees of plausibility—to surmount the obstacles to class litigation
raised by the 1991 Act. It will also suggest ways in which these obstacles might be avoided in the future, if, indeed, they should be
avoided at all.
II. TITLE VII AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits employment
discrimination based on race, religion, sex, color, and national origin.3 In the decades since 1964, Title VII cases have become a staple
of the federal court system and a prominent means of addressing
both real and perceived discrimination on the job.4 As initially
passed, Title VII provided only declaratory, injunctive, and other equitable relief (principally back and front pay) to victims of discrimination.5 This remedial scheme was consistent with those in other fed2. Taylor v. Flagstar Bank, 181 F.R.D. 509, 519 n.4 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (citation omitted); see also Zachery v. Texaco Exploration and Prod., Inc., 185 F.R.D. 230, 237 (W.D. Tex.
1999) (noting that the class action “may no longer be a valid vehicle” for employment discrimination claims seeking money damages).
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2 (1994).
4. In 1999, employment discrimination cases in general accounted for 8.6% of all federal civil filings. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United
States Courts, Table C-2A (1999).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g) (1994). Back pay is compensation for past income lost as a
result of discrimination. Front pay is compensation for lost future income (i.e., money that the
plaintiff would have made in the future absent unlawful discrimination). Front pay is considered a monetary substitute for the remedies of reinstatement or promotion and is typically
awarded where hostility between the parties makes reinstatement infeasible or where no job
openings are available at the time of judgment to enforce a remedial promotion. See Cassino v.
Reichold Chems., Inc., 817 F.2d 1338, 1346 (9th Cir. 1987); Briseno v. Central Technical
Community College Area, 739 F.2d 344, 348 (8th Cir. 1984). Both back pay and front pay
are generally regarded as equitable remedies rather than money damages. See United States v.
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eral workplace discrimination statutes before and since, which have
frequently omitted compensatory or punitive damages provisions.6
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 strengthened Title VII’s remedial
scheme by authorizing compensatory and punitive damages in cases
of intentional employment discrimination.7 While understanding the
damages provisions of the 1991 Act is essential to understanding its
impact on Title VII class actions, there is no indication in the legislative history that Congress considered the effect these provisions
might have on class litigation as opposed to individual claims.
The 1991 Act’s enhanced damages provisions were designed to
compensate victims of discrimination for humiliation, trauma, physical distress, medical expenses, and other economic and noneconomic
harms caused by workplace discrimination. They were also intended
to punish and deter employers who acted “with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved
[employee].”8 In passing these provisions, Congress intended to
“confirm that the principle of anti-discrimination is as important as
the principle that prohibits assaults, batteries, and other intentional
injuries to people”9 and to “ensure compensation commensurate
with the harms suffered by victims of intentional discrimination.”10

Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 921 (5th Cir. 1973) (back pay); Kramer v. Logan County
Sch. Dist., 157 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1998) (front pay).
6. See, e.g., National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1994) (providing affirmative relief, including back pay, for victims of unfair labor practices); Fair Labor Standards Act § 16(b), 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1994) (providing back pay, affirmative relief, and liquidated damages for claimants); Age Discrimination in Employment Act § 7(b), 29 U.S.C. §
626(b) (1994) (adopting remedies provisions of Fair Labor Standards Act); Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act § 2(a), 38 U.S.C. § 4323(d) (1994) (providing injunctive relief and liquidated damages for victims of anti-military discrimination).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (1994). Intentional discrimination cases are also known as
“disparate treatment” cases. In cases of unintentional discrimination, or “disparate impact”
cases, remedies remained equitable under the 1991 Act. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a)(1) (1994).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994).
9. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 15 (1991).
10. Id. at 18. Among the anecdotes included in the House report was that of a sexual
harassment victim who endured sleeplessness, severe neck pain, and nausea at work but was
awarded only one dollar in nominal damages under the pre-1991 remedial scheme. Id. at 66–
67. Another harassment victim was fired for being pregnant, lost her insurance, and was
shunned by her hospital, which threatened the seizure of her property to pay her medical bills.
She prevailed in her discrimination case and was compensated for lost income and medical expenses but received nothing for her “years of stress and humiliation.” H.R. REP. NO. 10240(II), at 25–26 (1991).
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The 1991 revisions also were motivated by a remedial anomaly in
race discrimination cases. The Civil Rights Act of 1866,11 which forbids racially motivated interference with the right to enter contracts,
had long been held to confer a right of action for job discrimination
on the theory that such discrimination constituted interference with
the right to enter contracts of employment.12 Because unlimited
compensatory and punitive damages were available under § 1981,13
plaintiffs claiming employment discrimination based on race could
recover full damages, while those claiming other forms of discrimination could not. Congress therefore made damages available for all Title VII plaintiffs in part to address this perceived inconsistency.14
Finally, the 1991 amendments were seen as an enforcement
mechanism: the House Report declares that the additional remedies
are necessary to “encourage citizens to act as private attorneys general” in enforcing Title VII.15 To protect the Seventh Amendment
rights of parties involved in such claims, the Act made trial by jury
available in cases seeking compensatory and punitive damages.16 The
sum of compensatory and punitive damages under the 1991 Act is
capped on a sliding scale ranging from $50,000 to $300,000, depending on the size of the employer.17
The language of the House Report on the 1991 Act places great
emphasis on the nature and extent of the harms suffered by some
victims of discrimination.18 It is clear that the House majority felt
strongly that intentional discrimination should be redressed with
both compensation and retribution where appropriate, and there is
every indication that Congress viewed itself as the white knight of
those whom the law protected. In subsequent litigation, however,
11. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994)).
12. See, e.g., Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454, 460 (1975).
13. See id. at 459–60.
14. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 65 (1991).
15. Id. at 64–65. That effort has been successful. Employment discrimination filings,
which as of 1990 had stabilized at approximately eight to nine thousand cases per year in the
federal courts, increased to 12,962 filings in 1993, 19,059 in 1995, and 22,490 in 1999.
Compare Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States Courts,
Table C-2A (1997) with Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the
United States Courts, Table C-2A (1999). While these are not all Title VII claims, Title VII
remains the broadest and most widely used employment discrimination statute.
16. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 29 (1991).
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) (1994).
18. See H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 66–69 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 25–
28 (1991).
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both litigants and courts would wrestle with the potentially serious
(and apparently unforeseen) restrictions imposed by these individual
remedies on the maintenance of Title VII class actions.
III. THE RULE 23 REQUIREMENTS FOR CLASS ACTIONS
The original Title VII remedies fit neatly within the procedural
scheme established for the certification and maintenance of class actions under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.19 A class
must pass two major tests to be certified under Rule 23. First, it
must possess the four attributes required by Rule 23(a): numerosity,
typicality, commonality, and adequacy of representation. Specifically,
(1) the class must be “so numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable” (numerosity); (2) there must be “questions of law or
fact common to the class” (commonality); (3) the claims or defenses
of the class representatives must be “typical of the claims or defenses
of the class” (typicality); and (4) the representative parties must be
able to “fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class” (adequacy of representation).20
Once these requirements are met, the class then must fit within
one of the three categories established under Rule 23(b).21
19. See Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999).
20. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a).
21. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b) provides as follows:
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action if the
prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the class
would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of the
class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as a
practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to
the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the
class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of
separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
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Rule 23(b)(1) generally applies when individual adjudication
would risk establishing inconsistent standards of behavior for the
party opposing the class or when adjudication of the class representatives’ claims would either dispose of the interests of other potential
plaintiffs or impede their ability to recover. The textbook 23(b)(1)
class involves a set of claims against a limited fund whose resources
might be exhausted by initial plaintiffs to the detriment of subsequent claimants.22 Rule 23(b)(1) typically does not apply in employment discrimination class actions. There is little risk of establishing inconsistent standards of behavior for a defendant employer, as
the standards to be enforced are clear: do not discriminate. Similarly,
class discrimination claims are not claims upon a limited fund as the
Rule 23 Advisory Committee understood the concept but are efforts
to remedy and deter certain types of harm by recovering equitable,
compensatory, or punitive relief for persons who have been wronged.
Rule 23(b)(2) applies when a defendant has “acted or refused to
act on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
with respect to the class as a whole.”23 Under the original Title VII
remedies, which were entirely equitable, Rule 23(b)(2) was the principal basis for certifying employment discrimination class actions.24
Indeed, the 1966 Advisory Committee comments to Rule 23(b)(2)
singled out civil rights classes as paradigmatic: “Illustrative [of
23(b)(2) classes] are various actions in the civil-rights field where a
party is charged with discriminating unlawfully against a class . . . .”25
Rule 23(b)(2) comes with an important caveat, according to the Advisory Committee: “The subdivision does not extend to cases in
which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly
to money damages.”26 While the Advisory Committee did not attempt to define the term “predominantly” (which appears nowhere
in Rule 23(b)(2) itself), this “predominance” requirement has been

undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum;
(D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
22. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 101 (1966).
23. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(2).
24. See, e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 614 (1997); Jefferson v.
Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir. 1999).
25. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
26. Id.
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central to efforts to assess the impact of the 1991 Act on class litigation, as discussed below.
The final Rule 23(b) category is Rule 23(b)(3), which permits
certification where a court finds that “questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and . . . a class action is superior to
other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the
controversy.”27 The “commonality” required by this section is a
stricter test than that of commonality under Rule 23(a) and requires
that the class members be “more bound together by a mutual interest in the settlement of common questions than . . . divided by the
individual members’ interest in the matters peculiar to them.”28 Rule
23(b)(3) also requires a finding that a class action is superior to other
methods of adjudication, such as the prosecution of consolidated or
individual claims. Rule 23(b)(3) permits courts to consider a variety
of factors in deciding whether to certify a class, including the interests of class members in controlling their claims individually, the existence of individual litigation concerning the same claims, the desirability of concentrating class claims in the particular forum, the
manageability of the class, and the desirability of certifying the class
to avoid “negative value suits,” in which the cost of individual litigation would outweigh the potential individual recovery.29
Rule 23(b)(3) classes are subject to an important “opt-out provision” imposed by Rule 23(c)(2). Under this provision, each potential
member of a 23(b)(3) class is entitled to notice of the action, notice
that all nonexcluded class members will be bound by the class judgment, and notice of the member’s right to be excluded from the
class upon request, leaving excluded members to a private right of
action.30 This provision exists as a hedge against the individual interests of potential 23(b)(3) class members, especially with respect to
their right to pursue and recover individual monetary damages. As
the Advisory Committee noted, in many Rule 23(b)(3) cases, the interests of individuals in pursuing their own claims “may be so strong

27. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3); See also Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., No. 93 C
4862, 1994 WL 445149, at *7 (N.D. Ill., Aug. 16, 1994).
28. Id. at *11.
29. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D); see also Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996).
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2).
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here as to warrant denial of a class action altogether.”31 Even where
those interests are not strong enough to bar a class action, Rule
23(b)(3) recognizes that individual interests may still exist and must
be respected as a matter of due process by allowing potential class
members to choose to pursue their own claims instead of joining in
with the class.32
These Rule 23 requirements provide the procedural framework
for class actions, and the interplay between those requirements, the
remedies now afforded under Title VII, and the constitutional rights
of the parties leads to the current uncertainties concerning the maintainability of Title VII class actions.
IV. TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS BEFORE THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1991
Before the passage of the 1991 Act, the courts had developed
fairly well-defined procedures for certifying and managing Title VII
class actions. These procedures were famously outlined and approved
by the Supreme Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v.
United States.33 Title VII class actions before 1991 typically involved
allegations that the employer had engaged in a pattern and practice
of intentional discrimination, were typically certified under Rule
23(b)(2), and were typically handled in two phases. In the first, or
liability phase, the plaintiffs had the burden of proving prima facie
the existence of a pattern or practice of discrimination—in other
words, that discrimination was the employer’s “standard operating
procedure.”34 This could be achieved through various combinations
of statistical and anecdotal evidence.35 The employer then could attempt to rebut the plaintiffs’ showing by demonstrating that the
plaintiffs’ proof was “inaccurate or insignificant.”36 If the plaintiffs’
proof withstood challenge, then the pattern and practice was consid-

31. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 104–05 (1966).
32. See id. at 104–05; see also Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–47 (1999).
33. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
34. Id. at 336.
35. See id at 337. (statistical evidence); EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 960 F.
Supp. 203, 205 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (holding that liability phase can encompass “‘direct statistical
evidence, anecdotal evidence . . . and any other evidence that bears on the issue of whether a
pattern of discrimination existed’” (quoting Sperling v. Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc., 924 F. Supp.
1346, 1352 (D.N.J. 1996))).
36. International Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 360–62 (1977).
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ered proven and the court could grant classwide prospective relief,
including injunctions and other remedial orders.37 To address individual claims, such as those for back pay or reinstatement, this initial
phase was followed by a remedial phase in which the court (or, in
some cases, a special master) would determine the appropriate remedies for the individual class members. In this second phase, each class
member only had to show (1) that he experienced an adverse employment action and (2) the extent of any resulting loss. Because of
the pattern and practice established in the first phase, each class
member in the second phase enjoyed a rebuttable presumption that
the adverse action and resulting loss were the product of discrimination. The employer then could attempt to rebut the presumption as
to each class member and thereby avoid liability to that class member
by proving that the disputed employment action had been taken for
a nondiscriminatory reason.38
For the most part, this paradigm worked smoothly under the equitable remedy scheme of the original 1964 Act. Class certification
was largely unproblematic under Rule 23(b)(2) because declaratory
and injunctive relief could be held to predominate absent the availability of money damages. (While individual class members could recover money in the form of back or front pay, this was considered an
equitable remedy that would not detract from the predominance of
declaratory and injunctive relief.39) Moreover, the availability of only
equitable remedies meant that there was no right to a jury trial, and
thus courts were free to use devices such as special masters to handle
individual claims as efficiently as possible in the second phase.40 All of
this would change dramatically with the advent of the damages and
jury trial remedies afforded by the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
V. TITLE VII CLASS ACTIONS AFTER THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF
1991
The damages remedies provided by the 1991 Act have introduced serious complications in the certification and management of

37. See id. at 361.
38. See id.; Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 409 (5th Cir. 1998).
39. See supra note 6; Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 896 (7th Cir.
1999).
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(5) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (authorizing use of special
masters); Kraszewski v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co., 912 F.2d 1182, 1183 (9th Cir. 1990).
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Title VII class actions under Rule 23. While plaintiffs had typically
sought and obtained certification under Rule 23(b)(2) in such cases,
the availability of substantial and individualized money damages has
raised difficult questions about the predominance of declaratory and
injunctive relief required by Rule 23(b)(2). It has also raised procedural and constitutional questions about the need for or the
availability of an opt-out procedure for 23(b)(2) cases in which
individual claimants might want to reserve their monetary claims.
As to 23(b)(3) classes, the highly individualized nature of claims
for compensatory and punitive damages has raised questions under
the commonality requirement of that rule, while courts have struggled to determine whether a class of persons can be said to have sufficient matters in common when each of them seeks a personalized
remedy. Similarly, the presence of scores, hundreds, or even thousands of unique claims for damages has greatly complicated the manageability of Title VII classes, especially where the relevant damages
issues must be resolved by juries upon the demand of either party.
The presence of such claims increases the risk that a class action will
degenerate in practice into a series of minitrials, thereby becoming
unmanageable and defeating the efficiencies that class actions were
designed to realize. In addition, the very high limits on damages under the 1991 Act—up to $300,000 per plaintiff, depending on the
size of the employer—may have eliminated the threat of negative
value suits, which has been one of the primary bases for 23(b)(3)
certification.
The 1991 changes have also raised questions about the availability of the Teamsters-style bifurcation that had been used in declaratory or injunctive-based class actions in the past. Attempts to apply
such a process in light of the 1991 Act’s jury trial right may violate
the Seventh Amendment rights of the litigants. Because of the nature
of proof in employment discrimination cases, multiple juries might
be required to decide identical or substantially related issues of fact
in evaluating the various phases of such trials.
Finally, the high damages limits under the 1991 Act have paved
the way for “blackmail” class actions, in which a defendant’s monetary exposure can be used by plaintiffs and their lawyers to force a
settlement regardless of the merits of the case.
Trial courts have begun to address these issues with some regularity in Title VII cases, but these matters have only recently begun
to make their way to the appellate courts. The varying approaches
314
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taken by the courts—as well as their varying degrees of persuasiveness—indicate that these questions will continue to vex both litigants
and judges for some time to come.
A. The 23(b)(2) Class—The Problems of Predominance and Opt-Out
Rights
1. Rule 23(b)(2) and money damages
Rule 23(b)(2) was designed for classes in which declaratory or
injunctive relief is the predominant remedial issue. As the Federal
Rules Advisory Committee explained in its comments to Rule
23(b)(2), this section “does not extend to cases in which the appropriate final relief relates exclusively or predominantly to money damages.”41 Thus, a key question in the post-1991 litigation of Title VII
class actions has been whether the availability of money damages
means that such damages “predominate” over injunctive relief to
render Rule 23(b)(2) unsuitable as a means of certifying a class.
One difficulty in answering this question has been determining
the definition of “predominantly.” The language of Rule 23(b)(2)
does not absolutely rule out money damages for a 23(b)(2) class,
and the Advisory Committee comments would apparently allow
23(b)(2) certification in some circumstances where money damages
are sought, so long as they are not the “exclusive” or “predominant”
form of relief. On the other hand, the Supreme Court has stated in
dicta that there is “at least a substantial possibility” that classes seeking money damages can never be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) due
to the lack of an opt-out provision by which individual claimants can
elect to pursue their remedies apart from the class.42 Absent a more
definitive holding, courts continue to be tasked with the job of determining when money damages “predominate” over other types of
relief in considering 23(b)(2) certification.

41. FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102 (1966).
42. Ticor Title Ins. Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994). The lack of clear authority on this point was noted by the court in Zachery v. Texaco Exploration and Production, Inc.,
185 F.R.D. 230, 244 (W.D. Tex. 1999) (“[T]here is no clear cut decision as to whether Rule
23(b)(2) contains an opt-out procedure.”).
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2. The Allison v. Citgo approach
To date, the most thorough appellate analysis of this issue in the
Title VII context is the Fifth Circuit’s opinion in Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp.43 Allison was an attempted Title VII race discrimination class action challenging hiring, promotion, training, and compensation practices at Citgo’s Lake Charles, Louisiana, facility. The
plaintiffs alleged both disparate impact and disparate treatment and
sought declaratory, injunctive, and equitable relief as well as compensatory and punitive damages for a potential class of over one
thousand members.44 The district court denied class certification,
and the ensuing appeal raised numerous issues about the applicability
of Rule 23 in light of the Civil Rights Act of 1991.
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit relied on the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(2) in denying the plaintiffs’
request for 23(b)(2) certification.45 Because of Rule 23(b)(2)’s emphasis on classwide declaratory and injunctive relief, the appeals
court found that the rule was designed to “concentrat[e] the litigation on common questions of law and fact” in order to evaluate and
impose “uniform group remedies.”46 In the court’s view, this urge
toward uniformity was demonstrated by the lack of an opt-out provision such as the one found under Rule 23(b)(3): 23(b)(2) class actions will bind class members without their consent precisely because
all of them are affected in substantially the same way by the conduct
complained of and will require substantially the same remedies to
cure the problem.47
Based on this principle of uniformity, the panel concluded that
monetary relief will be found to “predominate” in 23(b)(2) actions
43. 151 F.3d 402 (5th Cir. 1998).
44. See id. at 407.
45. See id. at 412–16; Celestine v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 165 F.R.D. 463, 468–69
(W.D. La. 1995).
46. Allison, 151 F.3d at 414.
47. See id. at 413. Some courts have nonetheless imposed an opt-out requirement on
23(b)(2) classes. See, e.g., Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 4:98CV00739, 2000 WL
1036245 (E.D. Ark. 2000); Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 663, 680 (E.D. Tex. 2000)
(extending opt-out rights to 23(b)(2) portion of hybrid Title VII class action); Martens v.
Smith Barney, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 243, 260 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that courts have discretion to extend opt-out rights to 23(b)(1) and (b)(2) classes). It is not clear that this is proper,
however, and the Supreme Court has recognized the “substantial possibility” that Rule
23(b)(2) cannot be used to certify a class where money damages are sought. Ticor Title Ins.
Co. v. Brown, 511 U.S. 117, 121 (1994).

316

5PIA-FIN.DOC

305]

2/22/01 8:07 PM

The Uncertain Future of Title VII Class Actions

“unless it is incidental to requested injunctive or declaratory relief.”48
By “incidental,” the court explained, it meant “damages that flow
directly from liability to the class as a whole on the claims forming
the basis of the injunctive or declaratory relief.”49 One index of the
“incidental” character of damages is the ease with which they can be
calculated. “Ideally, incidental damages should be only those to
which class members automatically would be entitled once liability to
the class (or subclass) as a whole is established.”50 The determination
of such “incidental” damages “should not require additional hearings to resolve the disparate merits of each individual’s case; it should
neither introduce new and substantial legal or factual issues, nor entail complex individualized determinations.”51
Having determined the standard to be applied under Rule
23(b)(2), the Allison court then held that compensatory damages
were neither uniform nor ministerial enough to avoid “predominating” under Rule 23(b)(2). Because compensatory and punitive damages are not presumed from the violation of a person’s rights, even a
plaintiff who could prove that he was discriminated against would be
required to present “specific individualized” proof to establish his
entitlement to damages. Damages for injuries stemming from discrimination—which may include compensation for emotional
trauma, accompanying physical injury, and any other tangible or intangible consequences of discriminatory treatment—“cannot be calculated by objective standards” and would introduce “new and substantial legal and factual issues” beyond those required to make a
liability determination.52 Accordingly, such damages would not flow
automatically from a finding of liability to the class, and such a class
could not be certified under Rule 23(b)(2).

48. Allison, 151 F.3d at 415.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The court noted that as a matter of precedent this was not inconsistent with
cases allowing back pay under Rule 23(b)(2) because back pay is “an integral part of the statutory equitable remedy.” Id. (quoting Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d
1122, 1125 (5th Cir. 1969)).
52. Id. at 417–18.
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3. The Allison dissent and the issue of back pay
The Allison majority’s view of Rule 23(b)(2) is not a novel one.53
The dissent nonetheless attacked the holding, claiming that the majority had created a rule that would absolutely preclude class certification in 23(b)(2) cases seeking damages.54 That misstates the holding of the majority, which noted that the Advisory Committee had
apparently meant to leave open the possibility of damages recoveries
in some circumstances under Rule 23(b)(2), subject to the “predominance” analysis.55 More plausible was the dissent’s argument
that the disallowance of damages could not be squared with the routine certification under Rule 23(b)(2) of classes seeking to recover
back pay: “Although back pay has often been characterized as an equitable remedy for practical purposes, functionally there is little to
distinguish back pay awards from compensatory damages. Both require complex individualized determinations.”56 This argument has
superficial appeal but is not altogether persuasive. It is arguable that
back pay proceedings are qualitatively different from damages determinations. Back pay determinations typically do not require highly
complex factual or legal adjudications. Instead, they involve only a
determination of how much pay an employee lost and whether any
offsets should be applied, for such things as interim earnings or failure to mitigate damages. While not entirely formulaic, such determinations are made according to methods of calculation that are well
developed and can be applied with some degree of classwide efficiency, especially because they need not be determined by juries.57 At
53. Other courts in non-Title VII cases have read Rule 23(b)(2) much as the Allison
court did and have denied 23(b)(2) certification where individualized damages determinations
would be required if liability were found. See Washington v. CSC Credit Servs. Inc., 199 F.3d
263 (5th Cir. 2000) (following Allison and holding that it would be error to certify 23(b)(2)
class under Fair Credit Reporting Act where monetary damages would not flow from declaratory relief but would require separate adjudication); Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823,
827 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding that certification of 23(b)(2) class not required in environmental contamination case where relief sought was primarily individualized money damages);
Marascalco v. International Computerized Orthokeratology Soc’y, Inc., 181 F.R.D. 331 (N.D.
Miss. 1998) (denying 23(b)(2) certification in action for breach of warranty and fraud; plaintiffs each sought damages in excess of $5 million, and availability of individual relief would depend on varying individual circumstances going to elements of fraud).
54. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 426–27 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 411.
56. Id. at 427 n.1 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
57. See BARBARA LINDEMANN & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 1848–56 (3d ed. 1996). These calculations are perhaps most complex in cases involving
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the least, one can plausibly argue that the calculation of such remedies is inherently more uniform than the assessment of compensatory
or punitive damages, which might involve medical, psychiatric, and
other types of tangible and intangible proof that could differ widely
among class members.
Moreover, even assuming that back pay and damages are conceptually similar for purposes of Rule 23(b)(2), that does not mean that
both should be available to a 23(b)(2) class. The monetary relief
available to a 23(b)(2) Title VII class, in the majority’s view, is equitable (e.g., back pay). That relief is therefore determined by the
court, without the additional procedural complications of a jury trial.
Considering that the availability of equitable monetary remedies in
class actions is entrenched as a matter of precedent, it would seem
consistent with the homogeneity of fact and remedy contemplated
by Rule 23(b)(2) to eschew the extra layer of fact finding and complication that would be imposed on such proceedings by jury damages determinations. In other words, the availability of some monetary recovery under Rule 23(b)(2) does not mean that there should
be more, especially when that “more” is at odds with the homogeneity that Rule 23(b)(2) was supposed to represent.
4. Other appellate views—Jefferson v. Ingersoll International, Inc.
and Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers
To date, only one other appellate court has considered the Rule
23(b)(2) issue in a post-1991 Title VII class action. In Jefferson v.
Ingersoll International, Inc., 58 the Seventh Circuit heard an interlocutory appeal from a Title VII class certification under Rule
23(b)(2). The appeals court reversed and remanded the case to the
trial court with instructions to consider, among other things,
whether the money damages sought by the class were “more than
incidental” to the requested equitable relief, and, if not, whether
23(b)(2) certification is ever permissible when money damages are
sought. In so doing, the court agreed with Allison that 23(b)(2) certification would be appropriate only where “monetary relief is incidental to the equitable remedy—so tangential . . . that the due proc-

claims of discriminatory failure to hire or failure to promote, in which there may be more class
members than available positions, and some method must therefore be used for allocating limited back pay to the class. Nonetheless, these procedures are also fairly well-established. See id.
58. 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999).
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ess clause does not require notice [and the opportunity to opt
out].”59 The Seventh Circuit therefore recognized that there are circumstances under Title VII in which the pursuit of money damages
will prevent 23(b)(2) certification. The Seventh Circuit’s opinion did
not, however, purport to direct how this issue should be resolved on
remand.
The Seventh Circuit later applied Jefferson to decertify another
class in Lemon v. International Union of Operating Engineers,60 while
continuing to avoid deciding the Rule 23 issues. In Lemon, members
of a local union filed a Title VII class action, alleging that the union
discriminated against women and minorities in its hiring referral system. The district court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(2) without imposing an opt-out provision, but the appellate court reversed.
Relying on Jefferson, the court held that the seeking of individual
damages “jeopardizes [the] presumption of cohesion and
homogeneity” by requiring “judicial inquiry into the particularized
merits of each individual plaintiff’s claim.”61 Further, it would violate
due process to deprive individual class members of the chance to opt
out of such a class where money damages were at issue, precisely because of this potential divergence of interests.62 Accordingly, the
court held that the trial judge had abused his discretion by certifying
a 23(b)(2) class without giving the class members a chance to opt
out.On remand, as it had in Jefferson, the court directed the trial
judge to consider three options: (1) certifying the class under Rule
23(b)(3); (2) certifying the equitable issues under Rule 23(b)(2) and
the legal issues under Rule 23(b)(3); or (3) certifying a Rule
23(b)(2) class but imposing an opt-out provision.63 As in Jefferson,
the appeals court did not consider whether any of the three options
themselves might be improper (for example, whether a class seeking
money damages can be certified under Rule 23(b)(2) at all), nor did
it tell the lower court how the issue should be resolved.64
59. Id. at 898–99. The court also suggested (without deciding) that the injunctive aspects of the case could be severed from the other claims and certified separately under Rule
23(b)(2). The issue of bifurcation of class claims is discussed infra Part V.C.
60. 216 F.3d 577 (7th Cir. 2000).
61. Id. at 580.
62. See id.
63. See id. at 581–82.
64. The Eastern District of Arkansas relied upon Jefferson and Lemon and adopted their
proposed third option, certifying a Title VII class under Rule 23(b)(2) and imposing an optout provision. See Robinson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., No. 4:98CV00739, 2000 WL 1036245
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5. Other post-1991 cases restricting 23(b)(2) certification
District courts that have considered 23(b)(2) certification under
Title VII both before and after Allison have generally agreed that the
predominance analysis is necessary, and a number of those courts
have rejected attempts to certify employment discrimination classes
under Rule 23(b)(2) where compensatory and punitive damages
were sought.65
6. Post-1991 cases granting 23(b)(2) certification
Other courts have granted 23(b)(2) certifications under Title
VII. In Warnell v. Ford Motor Co.,66 the plaintiffs sought certification
of a class of women alleging sexual harassment. The court certified
the class under Rule 23(b)(2), noting that the plaintiffs sought a
permanent injunction and a declaration of liability against Ford, and
holding without further analysis that the accompanying claims for
money damages were “incidental” to these equitable claims.67 The
Northern District of California certified a 23(b)(2) class in Butler v.
Home Depot, Inc.68 despite the plaintiffs’ substantial claims for money
damages. Relying primarily on an analogy to pre-1991 cases involv(E.D. Ark. July 3, 2000). The court went on to adopt a Teamsters-style approach to the adjudication of the case without addressing the consequent Seventh Amendment problems (discussed below) or the contradictions inherent in the adjudication of individualized damages
claims under Rule 23(b)(2) for those class members who did not opt out.
65. See Adams v. Henderson, 197 F.R.D. 162, 171 (D. Md. 2000) (denying 23(b)(2)
certification to Title VII class; money damages “predominate” under 23(b)(2) when presence
of monetary claims suggests that notice and right to opt out are necessary); Zapata v. IBP,
Inc., 167 F.R.D. 147, 162 (D. Kan. 1996) (finding that monetary relief therefore predominated although plaintiffs alleged that only monetary relief would make class members whole for
racially hostile work environment and denying 23(b)(2) certification); Griffin v. Home Depot,
Inc., 168 F.R.D. 187, 190–91 (E.D. La. 1996) (holding without analysis that predominant
relief sought by sex discrimination class is “economic and not injunctive” and denying
23(b)(2) certification); Gorence v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., No. 93 C 4862, 1994 WL 445149,
at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 1994) (denying 23(b)(2) certification where complaint and class certification memorandum sought declaratory and injunctive relief but prayer for relief mentioned
only compensatory, punitive and liquidated damages, and promotions and finding that plaintiffs’ “primary motivation” deemed money damages); Faulk v. Home Oil, Inc., 184 F.R.D.
645 (M.D. Ala. 1999) (following Allison in denying 23(b)(2) certification in race discrimination case).
66. 189 F.R.D. 383 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
67. See id. at 389 (quoting Senn v. United Dominion Indus., Inc., 951 F.2d 806, 813
(7th Cir. 1992). The Warnell court rejected Allison in part based on the Fifth Circuit’s published denial of petition for rehearing in that case. See infra Part V.C.2.
68. 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 51 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
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ing back pay awards, the court held that class certification under
23(b)(2) is not precluded where monetary relief is sought. The court
then somewhat startlingly held that the mere allegation of a policy
and practice of denying equal opportunities to women “is sufficient
to satisfy the Rule 23(b)(2) requirement.”69 The court therefore severed and certified claims regarding liability, injunctive relief, and
classwide punitive damages, deferring a ruling on class treatment of
individual damages.70 A similar approach was followed in Shores v.
Publix Super Markets, Inc.71 There the court certified a class under
Rule 23(b)(2) based on its finding that the class had already satisfied
the “commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a). The court then bifurcated the trial into a first phase covering liability and a second
phase covering damages. The court acknowledged that it had “not
determined what means it will employ to efficiently resolve Stage II
damages claims. Nor has it determined how punitive damages will be
handled.”72
At least one of these cases is consistent with the holding of Allison despite coming out the opposite way on the facts. In Arnold v.
United Artists Theatre Circuit, Inc.,73 the court certified a 23(b)(2)
class alleging disability discrimination in movie theater access under
the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 and California state law.
The California statute allowed compensatory damages for each violation, and the court considered whether such damages predominated
over the requested injunctive relief. Significantly, each plaintiff

69. Id. at 55.
70. The problems raised by bifurcated trials under the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are discussed infra Part V.C. It should nonetheless be pointed out here that the Butler court’s inclusion of “classwide” punitive damages in the phase-one determination may have been incorrect.
Arguably, liability for punitive damages depends on individual circumstances. It cannot be imposed as a result of a classwide determination of pattern-and-practice liability, which does not
purport to determine whether any single class member has been a victim of discrimination,
much less whether each class member has been treated with “malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an aggrieved individual” as required to justify a punitive award. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 417–18 (5th Cir. 1998); see also
42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(1) (1994). The language of the 1991 Act seems to confirm this: the Act
provides for punitive awards to “a complaining party,” not to a class as a whole. 42 U.S.C. §
1981a(b)(1) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). If a class and a “party” were the same thing, then the
damages caps imposed by 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3) would limit class recovery to $300,000
because that limit caps recovery for a “party.” That clearly was not what Congress intended.
71. 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH), ¶ 44,477 (M.D. Fla. 1996).
72. Id. ¶ 87,689.
73. 158 F.R.D. 439 (N.D. Cal. 1994).
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sought only the $250 statutory minimum damage award for each
violation. Comparing such an award with cases in which back pay
was permitted in 23(b)(2) class actions, and noting that 23(b)(2)
was “specifically designed” for civil rights classes, the court concluded that the action was maintainable as a 23(b)(2) class because
the damages assessment would not require “a complicated, individual-specific calculus.”74
As discussed below, the named plaintiffs’ forswearing of full
money damages on behalf of a class raises important questions about
the appropriateness of class certification that were not addressed in
Arnold. Nonetheless, the Arnold decision is largely consistent with
Allison and related cases. Because the amount of damages at issue
was small, it is plausible to consider such damages as incidental to
the more sweeping injunctive relief sought, which was the physical
alteration of over seventy movie theaters to accommodate disabled
patrons.75 Further, because the amount of damages was fixed as to
each plaintiff, the determination of damages would be a mechanical
matter once liability was established and would not require additional fact finding or the analysis of complex issues of law.
7. Foregoing money damages—Zachery v. Texaco
The complications introduced by money damages in 23(b)(2)
cases could be avoided if class members simply did not seek money
damages at all in disparate treatment cases.76 Such an attempt was rejected, however, in Zachery v. Texaco Exploration and Production,
Inc.77 The plaintiffs in Zachery sought certification of a class of alleged victims of intentional and unintentional race discrimination in
pay, promotions, and hiring. As part of their litigation strategy, the
named plaintiffs dropped their claims for compensatory and punitive
damages and sought 23(b)(2) certification.78 The court nonetheless
denied class certification because of concerns that the unnamed
plaintiffs might thereby be stripped involuntarily of their right to recover damages. Central to this holding was the apparent unavailabil-

74. Id. at 452.
75. See id. at 444, 445.
76. In a pure disparate impact case, only equitable relief is available, and damages are
therefore not an issue.
77. 185 F.R.D. 230 (W.D. Tex. 1999).
78. See id. at 242.
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ity of an opt-out procedure under 23(b)(2). The Zachery court noted
that the Supreme Court had raised this issue in Ticor Title Insurance
Co. v. Brown79 but then had chosen not to decide it, meaning that
there was “no clear cut decision” on the availability of an opt-out
procedure in 23(b)(2) cases.80 This meant that should relief be
granted to a 23(b)(2) class that excluded money damages it would
be possible that no class member would be able to recover such
damages because the entire class would necessarily be bound by the
judgment. A plaintiffs’ victory in the class action might therefore
stand as a bar to any subsequent actions by the class members to recover the money damages that their representatives had forsworn.81
Thus, the court concluded that the decision to drop monetary damages could not be “imposed upon the absent class members without
raising a very serious conflict of interest” and refused to certify the
class.82
The Zachery decision encapsulates many of the problems inherent in trying to reconcile the damages provisions of the 1991 Act
with 23(b)(2) class certification. The individualized nature of such
relief is at odds with the homogeneity of harm and remedy presupposed by 23(b)(2) certification. At the same time, attempts to forego
such relief may be barred by the lack of an opt-out provision—a provision that is not part of 23(b)(2) precisely because of the common
interests and remedies of the archetypal 23(b)(2) class.
8. The end of the 23(b)(2) Title VII class?
For all of these reasons, it would appear that the more persuasive
authority has denied 23(b)(2) certification in Title VII class actions.
Because the 23(b)(2) class is a homogeneous class as to which homogeneous relief can be granted, the presence of individualized
claims seems incompatible with that type of action. Those cases that

79. 511 U.S. 117, 120–21 (1994).
80. See Zachery, 185 F.R.D. at 244 (citing Ticor Title Ins. Co., 511 U.S. at 120–21).
81. See id. at 243–44.
82. Id. at 244. Another court has characterized this problem as a “catch-22”: if the
plaintiffs do not seek full relief, they could be accused of being inadequate class representatives.
If they do seek full relief, then under Zachery they may fail to meet the 23(b)(2) requirements
for certification. Smith v. Texaco, Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 663, 679 (E.D. Tex. 2000). The Smith
court sidestepped this dilemma by certifying only the equitable claims under Rule 23(b)(2)
with an opt-out provision and certifying the damages claims under Rule 23(b)(3). See infra
Part V.C (discussing this type of split certification).
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have nonetheless certified 23(b)(2) classes have done so in express or
implicit reliance on pre-1991 cases and their treatment of equitable
back pay relief—a type of relief that is generally less complex and less
individualized than compensatory or punitive damages and which is
therefore less at odds with the fundamental purposes of Rule
23(b)(2).
In addition to the incompatibility of individualized damages with
the 23(b)(2) model, the apparent or arguable lack of an opt-out procedure for 23(b)(2) classes should preclude attempts to bind class
members to the adjudication of their monetary claims in a 23(b)(2)
case. Unlike Rule 23(b)(3), which entitles potential class members to
notice of the class action and the opportunity to “opt out” of the
class to pursue their claims individually, Rule 23(b)(2) class actions
bind all class members with or without their consent. This is consistent with the homogeneity of harm and remedy contemplated by
Rule 23(b)(2): if all class members are harmed in a similar way and if
that harm can be remedied through the same declaratory or injunctive relief, then it makes sense to apply that relief once to all class
members rather than allowing individualized adjudication and risking
inconsistent or inefficiently repetitive outcomes. Where damages
claims are at issue, however, courts have been wary of the right to
opt out as a matter of due process and have frequently looked to
Rule 23(b)(3) rather than 23(b)(2) to address such claims.83 If the
1991 remedies are a square peg, Rule 23(b)(2) is a round hole, and,
as the two presently exist, they cannot be fitted without distorting
them both.
B. 23(b)(3) Classes—Commonality, Manageability, and Negative
Value
The certification of Title VII class actions under Rule 23(b)(3)
has also become problematic in the wake of the 1991 Act’s damages
provisions. In particular, the 1991 remedies have raised questions
concerning commonality, manageability, and negative value in adjudicating 23(b)(3) certification.

83. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815 (1999); Jefferson v. Ingersoll
Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 897 (7th Cir. 1999). See infra Part V.B.
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1. Commonality
A primary issue under Rule 23(b)(3) has been that of commonality: whether, when each plaintiff or class member seeks compensatory
and punitive damages, “questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members.”84 Under the 1991 Act, entitlement to compensatory and perhaps punitive damages will turn on each plaintiff’s private experience of discrimination as well as on personal factors (such
as psychiatric history, medical history, family situation, or other social
particularities) that may influence the type or degree of emotional or
other harm resulting from that discrimination. Accordingly, when
such damages are sought, there is a strong possibility that questions
affecting individual members will predominate, thereby precluding
23(b)(3) certification.
Nonetheless, it seems clear that a claim for damages will not inevitably preclude 23(b)(3) certification. The Advisory Committee
appears to have taken a balanced view of this issue, with an eye toward promoting judicial efficiency. As the Committee explained, a
primary purpose of the rule is the achievement of economies of scale
for courts and litigants:
The court is required to find, as a condition of holding that a class
action may be maintained under this subdivision [23(b)(3)], that
the questions common to the class predominate over the questions
affecting individual members. It is only where this predominance
exists that economies can be achieved by means of the class-action
device.85

Thus, the presence of individual damages claims would not necessarily bar 23(b)(3) certification, so long as the resulting class was
an efficient collective means of disposing of those claims. The Committee continued:
In this view, a fraud perpetrated on numerous persons by the use of
similar misrepresentations may be an appealing situation for a class
84. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3). This requirement of “commonality” under Rule 23(b)(3)
should not be confused with the “commonality” requirement of Rule 23(a), which asks
whether there are “questions of law or fact common to the class.” The 23(a) “commonality”
standard has generally been viewed as less rigorous than the one in Rule 23(b)(3). See Gorence
v. Eagle Food Ctrs., Inc., No. 93 C 4862, 1994 WL 445149 at *11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16,
1994).
85. FED. R. CIV. P. 23, advisory committee’s notes, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966).
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action, and it may remain so despite the need, if liability is found,
for separate determination of the damages suffered by individuals
within the class. On the other hand, although having some common core, a fraud case may be unsuited for treatment as a class action if there was material variation in the representations made or in
the kinds or degrees of reliance by the persons to whom they were
addressed.86

The availability of Rule 23(b)(3) certification will therefore turn
less on the mere availability of money damages than on the possibility of achieving efficiency by the adjudication of common damages
claims through use of the class device.
Courts confronting the 23(b)(3) commonality issue following
the 1991 Act have reached mixed results. Here, too, Allison provides
the only direct appellate authority to date under Title VII. The Allison court rejected 23(b)(3) certification of the class before it, holding
that the individual-specific damages issues raised by the plaintiffs
meant that a class action would likely degenerate into “multiple lawsuits separately tried.”
The plaintiffs’ claims for compensatory and punitive damages must
therefore focus almost entirely on facts and issues specific to individuals rather than the class as a whole: what kind of discrimination
was each plaintiff subjected to; how did it affect each plaintiff emotionally and physically, at work and at home; what medical treatment did each plaintiff receive and at what expense; and so on and
so on. Under such circumstances, an action conducted nominally as
a class action would “degenerate in practice into multiple lawsuits
separately tried.”87

The Eleventh Circuit has also rejected 23(b)(3) certification in a
discrimination case, Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Systems, Inc.88
While Rutstein is not an employment discrimination case, it would
86. Id.
87. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting
Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.19 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing FED. R.
CIV. P. 23 advisory committee’s notes)). The Seventh Circuit, in Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l,
Inc., appeared to hint that 23(b)(3) certification could be appropriate in Title VII class actions
precisely because of the availability of money damages, which made 23(b)(3) a more suitable
choice than 23(b)(2) due to the opt-out provision. 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999). The
Seventh Circuit directed the district court on remand to consider 23(b)(3) certification as one
possibility but stated in the same breath that it “did not broach” the question whether
23(b)(3) certification was “sound” in the case before it. Id. at 899.
88. 211 F.3d 1228 (11th Cir. 2000).
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seem to leave little room for 23(b)(3) certification in any discrimination case in which individualized damages are sought.
The plaintiffs in Rutstein sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging
that Avis followed a “Yeshiva policy” designed to deny services to
individuals and businesses with Jewish-sounding accents or Jewishsounding names. The district court certified the case as a 23(b)(3)
class action, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed based both on the
elements of proof and the damages sought. As to proof, the court
noted that each plaintiff, in order to prevail, would have to prove
that he or she was intentionally discriminated against by the defendant. Thus, “[e]ach plaintiff will have to bring forth evidence demonstrating that the defendant had an intent to treat him or her less
favorably because of the plaintiff’s Jewish ethnicity.”89 Likewise, the
fact that each plaintiff sought compensatory and punitive damages
made the case inappropriate for class treatment.
To establish that they are entitled to some compensation, plaintiffs
will have to prove that they actually suffered some injury, whether
it be emotional or otherwise. The idea that individual injury could
be settled on a classwide basis is preposterous. Plaintiffs’ claims for
damages must “focus almost entirely on facts and issues specific to
individuals rather than the class as a whole: what kind of discrimination was each plaintiff subjected to[, and] how did it affect each
plaintiff emotionally and physically, at work and at home.”90

This requirement meant that “most, if not all, of the plaintiffs’
claims will stand or fall, not on the answer to the question whether
[Avis] has a practice or policy of [ethnic] discrimination, but on the
resolution of . . . highly case-specific factual issues.”91 This also made
Teamsters-style adjudication inappropriate because “the establishment of a policy or practice of discrimination cannot trigger the defendant’s liability for damages to all the plaintiffs in the putative
class,”92 which would still require individual determinations.
While the Rutstein court was careful to point out that “[t]his is
not a case alleging employment discrimination,” its holding would
89. Id. at 1235.
90. Id. at 1239–40 (quoting Allison, 151 F.3d at 419).
91. Id. at 1234 (quoting Jackson v. Motel 6 Multipurpose, Inc., 130 F.3d 999, 1006
(11th Cir. 1997) (decertifying class alleging discrimination in lodging where liability to class
members would turn on individualized circumstances of denial of motel rooms to each class
member)).
92. Id. at 1239.
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seem to leave little room for the certification of any class—including
a Title VII class—in which the plaintiffs or potential class members
seek individualized damages.93
Some district courts have likewise rejected 23(b)(3) certification
in Title VII cases on grounds of lack of commonality. In Adams v.
Henderson, the court held that the presence of individual damages
claims would require “individualized liability inquiries,” thereby
making it unsuitable for 23(b)(3) certification.94 The court in Zapata
v. IBP, Inc. denied such certification, noting that “claims for compensatory damages . . . greatly complicate the management of a
class” and that the assessment of psychological damages “would necessarily require an individual, subjective analysis.”95 The court in Gorence v. Eagle Food Centers, Inc. noted that the assessment of discrimination and “individualized damages” would require it to “hold
a series of mini-trials” and denied 23(b)(3) certification.96 And in
Faulk v. Home Oil Co., the court adopted the reasoning of the Allison court to deny 23(b)(3) certification to a potential class of race
discriminatees.97
By contrast, in Griffin v. Home Depot, Inc., the court denied a
motion to dismiss the class allegations in a sex discrimination complaint, holding that on the pleadings “one can postulate that there is
sufficient commonality of facts to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3).”98 This
amounts to a holding that 23(b)(3) certification is not automatically
precluded in Title VII class actions—a holding not at odds with the
Advisory Committee’s view of damages in 23(b)(3) cases but perhaps inconsistent with Allison’s recognition that damages determinations arising out of employment discrimination tend, by definition,
to be more individualized than typical.
2. Manageability
Hand-in-hand with the issue of commonality under Rule
23(b)(3) has gone the issue of manageability. One factor for consideration under Rule 23(b)(3) is “the difficulties likely to be encoun-

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.

See id. at 1241.
197 F.R.D. 162, 172 (D. Md. 2000).
167 F.R.D. 147, 163 (D. Kan. 1996).
No. 93 C 4862, 1994 WL 445149 at *11 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 16, 1994).
184 F.R.D. 645, 661–62 (M.D. Ala. 1999).
168 F.R.D. 187, 191 (E.D. La. 1996).
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tered in the management of a class action.”99 In the Title VII context, this has for the most part meant the logistical difficulties attendant to trying the individualized damages claims of hundreds or even
thousands of class members. The Allison court sketched the problem
concisely: “[T]his action must be tried to a jury and involves more
than a thousand potential plaintiffs spread across two separate facilities, represented by six different unions, working in seven different
departments, and alleging discrimination over a period of nearly
twenty years.”100 While each party is entitled to trial by jury in such
cases, it is unthinkable that a single jury could try this or even a
much smaller class action in which individual issues must be resolved
as to each plaintiff. Accordingly, courts in a variety of settings have
rejected the class device where the need for individual jury fact finding would render class adjudication unmanageable.101 At least one
court, on the other hand, has expressed a preference for class adjudication over individual adjudication in the Title VII context. In Smith
v. Texaco, Inc.,102 the court certified a 23(b)(3) class of approximately
200 employees alleging race discrimination in employment. In doing
so, the court noted that, should the claims be tried individually, “this
one district court will be totally and fully occupied for the larger part
of at least 200 weeks in the trial of these claims alone.”103 The court
therefore concluded that “individual actions would take up far more
judicial resources than a single class[,] . . . [and] a class action is a
superior means for managing this case because of the efficiencies involved in addressing the claims of about 200 class persons.”104
The distinction drawn by the Smith court between class and individual adjudication may be more rhetorical than actual: it is neither
obvious nor inevitable that the litigation of hundreds or thousands of
individual damages claims in a class action will be less time consuming than whatever individual lawsuits might be brought if class certi99. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b)(3)(D).
100. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 419 (5th Cir. 1998).
101. See, e.g., Zimmerman v. Bell, 800 F.2d 386, 390 (4th Cir. 1986) (holding that it is
proper to deny certification in securities fraud case due to “excessive managerial burden” imposed by individualized issues of knowledge and reliance); Alabama v. Blue Bird Body Co.,
573 F.2d 309, 328 (5th Cir. 1978) (upholding denial of certification in antitrust case where,
inter alia, certification might bring in “thousands of possible claimants,” leading to a “multitude of mini-trials”).
102. 88 F. Supp. 2d 663 (E.D. Tex. 2000).
103. Id. at 682.
104. Id. at 683.
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fication were denied. In either scenario, individualized, jury-based
fact finding must be undertaken as to each plaintiff or class member
who seeks to recover compensatory or punitive damages. Left to
their own devices, however, some members of a large group of individual plaintiffs might lose interest in pressing their claims, realize
that they did not have claims and so not bring them, or be unable to
find counsel to represent them should their case not be sufficiently
strong. Accordingly, the denial of a certification to a class of two
hundred members does not mean that two hundred individual lawsuits would be brought. This makes the rationale of the Smith court
less persuasive than it might first appear.
3. Negative value
Finally, the damages afforded by the 1991 Act have diminished
the force of another strong rationale for granting 23(b)(3) certification: the specter of the negative value lawsuit. One benefit of the
class action device is that it permits plaintiffs to aggregate small
claims. Although such claims individually may be worth less than the
cost of litigation, when combined as a class they may be worth the
efforts of an attorney, which grants the plaintiffs access to the courts
that they might not otherwise have. In certifying 23(b)(3) classes in
various settings, courts have sometimes relied on the fact that a denial of certification could effectively bar the bringing of such smallvalue individual claims. The danger of negative value suits has even
been described as “[t]he most compelling rationale”105 for granting
23(b)(3) certification in an appropriate case. The 1991 Act, however, has effectively removed this issue from the Title VII arena.
Given the significant statutory damages available under the 1991 Act
(ranging from $50,000 to $300,000 per plaintiff, depending on the
size of the employer), as well as the availability of attorney’s fees to
the prevailing party,106 the possibility of negative value suits is now
virtually nonexistent in Title VII cases.107

105. Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996).
106. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(k) (1994).
107. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 420 (5th Cir. 1998) (“The
relatively substantial value of these claims (for the statutory maximum of $300,000 per plaintiff) and the availability of attorney’s fees eliminate financial barriers that might make individual
lawsuits unlikely or infeasible.”).
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C. Procedural and Constitutional Problems of Bifurcation and Partial
Certification
Courts have attempted to circumvent Rule 23 concerns by applying various schemes of bifurcation or partial certification to Title VII
classes after the 1991 Act. The most frequent scheme of this type is
the certification of liability determinations and equitable relief under
Rule 23(b)(2), with the court reserving judgment on how to handle
damages claims or ordering their certification separately under Rule
23(b)(3).108 Another option, and one raised by the plaintiffs in Allison, is to certify a class only as to the disparate impact claims, leaving
the disparate treatment claims for individual trials or later class
treatment.109 Such schemes, however, pose serious problems under
Rule 23 and the Seventh Amendment. In many cases, these difficulties have been ignored or minimized by the courts, and one suspects
that in some cases courts are either unable or unwilling to confront
the profound changes wrought in the class action landscape by the
1991 Act.
1. Procedural issues
Much of the current judicial approach to Title VII class actions
has evolved from the class action management scheme approved in
International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States 110 and discussed above. The difficulties with such bifurcated proceedings under the 1991 Act are both procedural and constitutional: procedural
because of concerns about Rule 23(b)(3)’s commonality requirement and the misuse of Rule 23(c)(4) to evade that requirement and
constitutional because of concerns about the Seventh Amendment
rights of the parties in cases that could employ scores or even hundreds of juries under some circumstances.
The Teamsters paradigm was both sensible and effective when
only equitable remedies were available. It allowed for focused resolution of the dominant equitable issues, and, while individual relief
could be time consuming to administer, at least it was not complicated by individualized damages issues. The paradigm also worked
108. See, e.g., Smith v. Texaco Inc., 88 F. Supp. 2d 667, 682 (E.D. Tex. 2000); Shores v.
Publix, 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH), ¶ 44,477 (M.D. Fla. 1996); Butler v. Home Depot, Inc.,
70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 51 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
109. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 422.
110. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
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when neither party had the right to a jury trial, as special masters
could be used to streamline the proceedings in the damages phase.
This paradigm appears to have become ingrained in the psyches of
many litigants and judges, but its application is questionable in the
wake of the 1991 Act.
The Fifth Circuit faced these issues squarely in Allison and rejected (though not categorically) the use of bifurcated or partial class
proceedings in Title VII class actions. The Allison plaintiffs first suggested certifying all damages issues under Rule 23(b)(3) and the rest
of the case under Rule 23(b)(2). This suggestion was rejected based
on the Fifth Circuit’s 23(b)(3) “commonality” analysis. The court
noted that the case before it involved over one thousand potential
class members at two facilities, represented by six unions, in seven
departments, over a twenty-year period. Each of these thousand
claimants sought compensatory and punitive damages, which would
require individualized determination. The court therefore concluded
that Rule 23(b)(3) certification would be inappropriate in light of
this lack of commonality. The court also noted that the availability to
each plaintiff of attorney’s fees and up to $300,000 in damages
eliminated the possibility of a “negative value suit,” one of the most
frequent rationales for certifying a 23(b)(3) class.111 Thus, because
23(b)(3) certification was inappropriate, the attempt to “split” certification between Rules 23(b)(2) and 23(b)(3) was also improper. 112
The Allison plaintiffs suggested a second bifurcation scheme: certifying both their disparate impact and pattern-and-practice claims
under Rule 23(b)(2) or 23(b)(3), trying those issues to a jury, and
allowing the court to rule on the certification of the remaining
claims—such as those for damages—after the jury’s findings on these
initial issues.113 The court rejected this proposal as well, stating that
111. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 419–20 (quoting Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996)). The court also noted that multiple juries would be needed to
try the thousand or so damages claims, thereby raising Seventh Amendment issues. See infra
Part V.C.3.
112. The Seventh Circuit in Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir.
1999), suggested, without deciding, that classes of this type could be handled by certifying the
injunctive aspects under Rule 23(b)(2) and the damages aspects under Rule 23(b)(3). This
suggestion was made as part of the court’s discussion of how courts might preserve what it
viewed as essential opt-out rights where money damages are sought. See id. The court also
noted, however, that it expressed no view on whether Rule 23(b)(3) certification would be
proper in Title VII class actions, which it would have to be for such a scheme to work. See id.
at 899.
113. See Allison, 151 F.3d at 420–21.
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there was no reason to believe that adjudication of the first phase—
the pattern-and-practice and disparate impact issues—would make
possible the class certification of damages issues in the second phase
in light of its previous determination that the damages issues were
uncertifiable because of their individualized nature. Noting that under Teamsters there are no common issues between a first-stage pattern and practice finding of liability (which merely creates a rebuttable presumption of discrimination against affected individuals) and
the second remedial phase (which requires individuals to prove that
the presumption should apply to them and that they suffered damages),114 the court declined to certify the initial phase of the litigation
“when there is no foreseeable likelihood that the claims for compensatory and punitive damages could be certified in the class action
sought by the plaintiffs.”115
The court pointed out that what the plaintiffs were suggesting
was an end run around the commonality requirements of Rule
23(b)(3): by temporarily setting aside individual-specific damages issues (presumably by invoking Rule 23(c)(4)),116 the plaintiffs could
pretend for purposes of the first phase that common issues, rather
than individual-specific issues, would predominate for purposes of
23(b)(3) certification. The Allison court refused to indulge this
make-believe commonality based on Fifth Circuit precedent, which
forbids attempts to “manufacture predominance through the nimble
use of subdivision (c)(4).”117 Otherwise, a court in any case could
sever issues until only common issues remained, and “the result
would be automatic certification in every case where there is a common issue, a result that could not have been intended.”118
Other courts have not been so scrupulous. In Butler v. Home
Depot, for instance, the court certified a class under Rule 23(b)(2) as
to “liability and relief applicable to the class as a whole including declaratory and injunctive relief, and whether defendant is liable for
punitive damages.”119 The court admitted, however, that it had not

114. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867, 877–80 (1984).
115. Allison, 151 F.3d at 421.
116. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(4), which provides that “[w]hen appropriate . . . an action may be brought or maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues.”
117. Allison, 151 F.3d at 422 (quoting Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,
745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996)).
118. Id.
119. Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335 SI, 1996 WL 421436 at *1 (N.D.
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determined how to handle the phase-two damages determinations:
“The precise procedures to be used during the second phase, if any,
will be determined later in this litigation.”120 Similarly, in Shores v.
Publix the court approved a “hybrid” class, relying on pre-1991
Eleventh Circuit precedent.121 In the first phase, liability would be
resolved under Rule 23(b)(2), while in the second phase, damages
would be determined under a Rule 23(b)(3) opt-out procedure. Like
the Butler court, the Shores court admitted that it “has not determined what means it will employ to efficiently resolve Stage II
claims. Nor has it determined how claims for punitive damages will
be handled.”122
It is remarkable that at least these two courts have certified bifurcated Title VII classes while frankly acknowledging that they have no
idea how to handle the damages issues. This may reflect a habit of
Teamsters-style adjudication in Title VII class cases that has prevented some courts from grasping the implications of the 1991 Act.
On a darker view, it may reflect a desire to set the class process in
motion and force a settlement before thorny and time-consuming
issues such as individual damages have to be addressed. In both Butler and Shores, the result of certification was an expensive settlement,
and hence the strategy (if there was one) was successful.
2. The integrity of Rule 23
There are other sound reasons to prefer individual suits to class
actions that would, in any event, degenerate into individual suits. Individual suits preserve the integrity of Rule 23 by not stretching it to
cover classes that lack the required commonality and manageability.
They also avoid the danger that sweeping issues of liability may turn
on the whims of a single jury. In a bifurcated class action, one jury
will decide the existence of a pattern and practice of discrimination.
Cal. Jan. 25, 1996). As noted above, the Butler court’s apparent belief that there is such a
thing as “classwide” punitive damages may be incorrect.
120. Id. The parties never reached this issue: in September 1997 the case was settled for
$65 million. See Home Depot Agrees to Pay $65 Million to Settle Sex Discrimination Class Action, Daily Labor Report (BNA), Sept. 22, 1997, at A-11.
121. 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) ¶ 44,477, 87,688 (citing Cox v. American Cast Iron
Pipe Co., 784 F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1986)).
122. Shores v. Publix Super Markets, Inc., 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH), ¶ 44,477,
87,689 (M.D. Fla. 1996). As in Butler, the court never got that far. The case was settled in
January 1997 for a total of $81.5 million. See Publix Markets Agrees to Pay $81.5 Million to
Settle Sex Bias Suit, Daily Labor Report (BNA), Jan. 27, 1997, at AA-1.
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If that jury decides against the employer, it then establishes a presumption of discrimination that applies to every member of the class
who can prove an adverse job action in the individual adjudication
phase. While the presumption is rebuttable, that presumption will
have significantly heightened the burden on the employer and will
increase the chance that it will be found liable to each of the individual plaintiffs. Depending on the size of the employer and the size of
the class, a significant step will then have been taken toward the employer’s being found liable for millions upon millions of dollars in
individual liability (in Allison, up to $300 million).123 Spreading this
risk among multiple juries in individual cases will ensure that such
momentous issues of liability are determined by a process involving
the collective judgment of many juries, not the potential caprice of
one.
Courts in other contexts have recognized the value of nonclass,
case-by-case adjudication of matters that threaten defendants with
massive liability. In Matter of Rhone-Poulenc-Rorer, Inc.,124 the Seventh Circuit held that a case involving potentially bankrupting liability for manufacturers of antihemophiliac factor concentrate was unsuitable for class treatment, in part because trying the case as a class
action would place the fate of the industry in the hands of six people:
[I]f these [individual] trials are permitted to go forward . . . the
pattern that results will reflect a consensus, or at least a pooling of
judgment, of many different tribunals.
For this consensus or maturing of judgment the district judge proposes to substitute a single trial before a single jury . . . . One
jury . . . will hold the fate of an industry in the palm of its
hand . . . . [This] need not be tolerated when the alternative exists
of submitting an issue to multiple juries constituting in the aggregate a much larger and more diverse sample of decision-makers.
That would not be a feasible option if the stakes to each class

123. Further, this risk is one-sided: should the phase-one jury rule against the plaintiffs,
that decision has no res judicata effect as to the class members’ individual claims of discrimination because all that the decision means is that the employer does not discriminate against employees as a matter of standard practice. See Cooper v. Federal Reserve Bank, 467 U.S. 867,
877–80 (1984). Each class member remains free to file his own lawsuit (if timely), and the
employer may gain little peace of mind by prevailing in this phase of the class action. In essence, the plaintiffs have two chances instead of one to press their claims, and they and their
lawyers have little incentive not to “shoot the moon” in seeking class certification.
124. 51 F.3d 1293 (7th Cir. 1995).
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member were too slight to repay the cost of suit, even though the
aggregate stakes were very large and would repay the costs of a
consolidated proceeding. But this is not the case . . . .125

A case like Allison is not so different from a case like RhonePoulenc. The total exposure in money damages alone in Allison was
$300 million ($300,000 per class member times 1,000 potential
members). It is a frightening prospect to place a small handful of jurors in charge of such potentially crippling liability, especially where
there are sound reasons why such a thing would be a misuse of Rule
23. For this reason, the possibility of individual lawsuits rather then
implausible Teamsters-style classes is to be preferred (or at least not
bemoaned): plaintiffs who have colorable claims (and some who do
not) will still get their day in court because their suits are potentially
valuable, the judicial system will not necessarily be substantially more
burdened, and defendants can have their potential liability determined by something more than a single set of jurors.
3. Constitutional issues
The issues raised by bifurcating class actions after 1991 are not
only procedural but also constitutional. In a further effort to have
their class certified, the Allison plaintiffs proposed certifying only
their disparate impact claim, as to which money damages are not
available, as a means of sidestepping the problems posed by their
seeking individualized damages under their disparate treatment
claim. While such a proposal presents far fewer Rule 23 problems
than other attempts at certification, the availability of a jury trial under the 1991 Act also implicates the Seventh Amendment. This difficulty, the Allison court found, was insurmountable.
As the Allison court explained, the Seventh Amendment preserves the right to trial by jury in “suits at common law” where legal
rights are to be determined.126 Where the right to a jury exists, the
Seventh Amendment prohibits the reexamination of one jury’s findings by another fact finder.127 Although a disparate impact claim does
not implicate legal rights (the remedy being confined to equitable
relief), the jury trial right conferred by the 1991 Act extends to “all
125. Id. at 1299–1300, quoted with approval in Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84
F.3d 734, 748 (5th Cir. 1996).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
127. See Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 423 (5th Cir. 1998).
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factual issues necessary to determine liability” and damages under the
companion disparate treatment claim.128 Thus, where disparate impact and disparate treatment claims are joined (as they were in Allison), “the Seventh Amendment requires that all factual issues common to these claims be submitted to a jury for decision on the legal
claims before final court determination of the equitable claims.”129
The Allison court held that the certification of only the disparate
impact claims would be barred by the Seventh Amendment because
of the risk that subsequent fact finders in the disparate treatment litigation would be required to revisit the first jury’s determinations
both in determining liability toward individual plaintiffs and in determining their damages. This problem is a function of the particular
nature of proof in Title VII cases. In a disparate impact case, the
plaintiffs must first produce evidence that a challenged policy or
practice of the employer adversely affects a protected group. The
employer may rebut this evidence by showing “that the challenged
practice is job related for the position in question and consistent with
business necessity.”130 In a class disparate treatment case, the plaintiffs must first show prima facie that discrimination is the employer’s
standard practice, a showing that can be made by a combination of
statistical and anecdotal evidence.131 The employer then can attempt
to rebut this evidence, in the course of which it would almost inevitably attempt to show that the actions that are the subject of the
plaintiffs’ illustrative anecdotes were taken for legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons.
These methods of proof provide considerable potential for overlap between the fact finding in a disparate impact case and the fact
finding in a disparate treatment case, especially where the same employer practices and policies are challenged under both theories of
liability. As the Allison court explained:
It is the rare case indeed in which a challenged practice is jobrelated and a business necessity, yet not a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an adverse employment action taken pursuant to
that practice. Thus, a finding that a challenged practice is job re-

128. Id.
129. Id.
130. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
131. See Int’l Bd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 338–41 (1977); EEOC v.
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 960 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
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lated and a business necessity in response to a disparate impact
claim strongly, if not wholly, implicates a finding that the same
practice is a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s
actions in a pattern or practice claim.132

Under the Title VII scheme of proof, then, “significant overlap
of factual issues is almost inevitable whenever disparate impact and
pattern or practice claims are joined in the same [class] action.”133
Because consideration of these overlapping issues by different juries
would violate the Seventh Amendment, the Allison court declined to
certify the class only as to disparate impact.134
Other courts have certified bifurcated classes in spite of these
Seventh Amendment problems. Some courts have done so with little
analysis, brushing aside the Seventh Amendment issues by declaring
that the first- and second-phase determinations are legally distinct.
For instance, in Butler v. Home Depot, the court certified a class under Rule 23(b)(2) as to “liability and relief applicable to the class as a
whole, including declaratory and injunctive relief, and whether defendant is liable for punitive damages.”135 If liability were established,
the second phase would decide “individual compensatory damages.”136 The only aspect of divided certification addressed by the
court was the Seventh Amendment issue, which it disposed of by observing (based largely on pre-1991 cases) that courts have “routinely” adopted such a bifurcated approach. According to the Butler
court, the mere fact that the second phase would involve “individual
claims” meant that it would not involve the same issues as the first

132. Allison, 151 F.3d at 424.
133. Id. (citing Segar v. Smith, 738 F.2d 1249, 1268–70 (D.C. Cir. 1984)).
134. For another discussion of these Seventh Amendment issues, see Keith R. Fentonmiller, Damages, Jury Trials and the Class Action under the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 12 LAB. L.
421, 437–47 (1997). Had the Allison plaintiffs not joined disparate impact and disparate
treatment claims in the same case, this issue would not have been present. It appears to be an
open question what would happen if a class sued on a disparate impact theory and then tried to
bring a separate disparate treatment case under the same facts. Most likely, the same Seventh
Amendment issues would arise because there would still be factual overlap between these
claims, whether or not they were joined. It is doubtful that a class disparate impact claim could
be tried to judgment before the statute of limitations expired on disparate treatment claims
under the same facts (unless the plaintiffs could rely on a theory of continuing violation); thus,
the possibility of consecutive disparate impact and disparate treatment suits involving the same
facts would seem remote.
135. Butler v. Home Depot, Inc., No. C-94-4335 SI 1996 WL 421436, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 25, 1996).
136. Id. at *6.
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phase would.137 The court did not, however, analyze the methods of
proof under Title VII to the degree that Allison did and thus may
not have considered the matter as thoroughly. In EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,138 a class action under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, the court rejected Seventh Amendment concerns
much as the Butler court did. Noting that the phase-one finding of
liability did no more than establish a presumption of discrimination,
the court held that phase-two issues of individual liability were therefore “separate and distinct” issues of fact.139 As in Butler, the court
did not address the details of the ADEA’s proof scheme, which mirrors that of Title VII,140 in making this holding.
Decisions like these appear questionable (or at least hasty) in
light of the 1991 Act and the concerns raised by Allison. The
McDonnell Douglas court undermined its own holding when it noted
the various means of proof that an employer could use to rebut the
plaintiffs’ phase-one case:
Although the Defendant will not be able to present evidence regarding each individual termination at the liability trial, it can “introduce direct statistical evidence, anecdotal evidence, illustrative
evidence of individual dismissals and any other evidence that bears
on the issue of whether a pattern of discrimination existed.”141

This begs the question, however: if an employer introduces anecdotal evidence or “illustrative evidence of individual dismissals,”
then presumably, in determining the existence of a pattern of discrimination, a jury may find that there was discrimination behind
those events. In the second phase, when the liability to the particular
employees who were involved in these events is adjudicated, the liability jury would be free to decide that there was no discrimination
present, thereby discounting evidence that the first jury found dispositive. Thus, while the questions of pattern and practice and individual liability are indeed separate issues in the sense that the answer to
the first question (did the employer discriminate as a matter of practice?) does not resolve the second (was this particular class member

137. Id.
138. 960 F. Supp. 203 (E.D. Mo. 1996).
139. See id. at 205.
140. Brennan v. Metropolitan Opera Ass’n., Inc., 192 F.3d 310, 316 (2d Cir. 1999).
141. EEOC v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 960 F. Supp. 203, 205 (E.D. Mo. 1996)
(quoting Sperling v. Hoffmann-LaRoche, Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1346, 1353 (D.N.J. 1996)).
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discriminated against?), the scheme of proof in employment discrimination cases raises the risk that different juries may make different findings based on the same facts—a situation that is prohibited
under the Seventh Amendment.
It may be that the Seventh Amendment problems in Allison were
simply ones of scale. The court appears to have assumed that multiple juries would be needed to resolve the individual claims—a safe
assumption in a class covering one thousand potential members. It is
conceivable, however, that a Title VII class could be small enough to
have all of its claims heard by a single jury. Rule 23 requires no
minimum number of class members for certification, and Rule 23
classes have been certified with as few as thirteen members.142 While
a small class may not solve the problems of predominance and commonality, it would at least avoid Seventh Amendment problems by
making it possible to use a single fact finder throughout.
4. The Allison denial of rehearing
As a coda to the bifurcation issues raised by Allison, it is worth
examining the court’s somewhat cryptic denial of rehearing. The
logic of Allison would seem to preclude most types of divided or partial certifications, but the Allison court apparently did not intend to
prohibit such schemes absolutely. In denying rehearing, the court
acknowledged that some forms of partial certification might survive.
The trial court utilized consolidation under rule 42 rather than
class certification under Rule 23 to manage this case . . . . We are
not called upon to decide whether the district court would have
abused its discretion if it had elected to bifurcate liability issues that
are common to the class and to certify for class determination those
discreet liability issues.143

142. See, e.g., Dale Elec., Inc. v. R.C.L. Elec., Inc., 53 F.R.D. 531, 534–35 (D.N.H.
1971) (certifying class of thirteen members in patent infringement case); Cypress v. Newport
News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass’n, 375 F.2d 648, 653 (4th Cir. 1967) (certifying class
of eighteen minority physicians in race discrimination case).
143. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 434 (5th Cir. 1998). The trial
court explained: “[I]n some instances it may be appropriate to consolidate cases with similar
facts and issues under Fed. R. Civ. P. 42. However, it will be necessary for the unnamed
potential class members to file their own lawsuits rather than intervene in the present action.”
Celestine v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 165 F.R.D. 463, 471 (W.D. La. 1995). Examples of such
consolidation might be trying simultaneously all promotion claims involving the same decisionmaker or all claims of discriminatory discipline involving the same supervisor and the same
employee conduct.
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This has the ring of a declaration that will become famously puzzled over in the years ahead. Some courts have taken it to undermine
the main opinion’s holdings entirely, reducing them to dicta.144
Others have read it more narrowly as an acknowledgment that the
principles discussed in the main opinion are not absolute.145 The latter view appears more likely: had the Fifth Circuit wanted to nullify
large portions of its opinion, it could simply have withdrawn them.
Moreover, its holdings concerning the nature of Rule 23 were not
dicta because the decision appealed from was a denial of Rule 23 certification. And the Fifth Circuit itself relied on Allison as precedent
in a later case, following Allison’s holdings as to Rule 23(b)(2) predominance in reversing certification of a class under the Fair Credit
Reporting Act.146
Yet, if nullification is not what the statement means, determining
what it does mean is still challenging. One possibility is that liability
issues could be certified as “stand-alone” class claims only to the extent that they do not implicate the manageability and Seventh
Amendment concerns addressed in the main opinion. But such “liability issues” virtually by definition (according to the Allison court)
could not be issues that shared any facts in common with the determination of compensatory or punitive damages because of the constraints of Rule 23 and the Seventh Amendment. Thus, such issues
would have to be either damages issues that were not individualized,
such as liquidated damages claims, or equitable issues that did not
implicate fact issues that could arise in evaluating the disparate
treatment claims of the individual plaintiffs. Such claims, if they exist,
would therefore be very narrow indeed. One possible example would
be claims for relief from specific policies and procedures that were
challenged only on a disparate impact theory. For these sorts of
claims, damages would not be available, the facts necessary to prove
such a claim would not be at issue in any individual’s disparate
treatment case (because there would be no such cases), and certification as to that discreet issue could proceed. Thus, the Allison plaintiffs may have hampered themselves by the breadth of their challenge: if class status is the goal, then Allison suggests that a narrower
144. See, e.g., Warnell v. Ford Motor Co., 189 F.R.D. 383, 389 (N.D. Ill. 1999).
145. See, e.g., Jefferson v. Ingersoll Int’l, Inc., 195 F.3d 894, 898 (7th Cir. 1999); Faulk
v. Home Oil Co., 184 F.R.D. 645, 660–61 (M.D. Ala. 1999); Riley v. Compucom Sys., Inc.,
No. CIV. A398CV1876L, 2000 WL 343189, at *3 n.6 (N.D. Tex. March 31, 2000).
146. See Washington v. CSC Credit Servs., 199 F.3d 263, 269–70 (5th Cir. 2000).
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focus may be a more sure road to success and a pure disparate impact
case the safest route of all.
D. The Problem of the Blackmail Class
A final problem introduced by the 1991 Act is the problem of
the blackmail class—the risk that the monetary exposure presented
by the availability of compensatory and punitive damages to each
class member will force defendants to settle regardless of any wrongdoing. The plaintiffs in Allison tried overtly to exploit this issue, arguing on appeal that partial certification would “facilitate” settlement. The Allison court rejected that argument: “[W]e should not
condone a certification-at-all-costs approach to this case for the simple purpose of forcing a settlement. Settlements should reflect the
relative merits of the parties’ claims, not a surrender to the vagaries
of an utterly unpredictable and burdensome litigation procedure.”147
These are laudable goals, but they are routinely trampled on in class
litigation. Class actions are frequently settled for reasons having
nothing to do with their merits: faced with potentially overwhelming
liability, bad publicity, and enormous legal fees (even if it prevails),
an employer may capitulate and settle the case even though it may
lack merit and even though it ultimately may not be maintainable as
a class action.148 Nor are plaintiffs’ lawyers shy about this goal. In the
author’s own experience, class plaintiffs’ lawyers have been heard privately to say that their goal is to bankrupt the defendant or, more
colorfully, to “blow them off the New York Stock Exchange.” This
approach has been recognized in class cases as the principle of “judicial blackmail.”149 While liability in Title VII cases does not always
rise to the potentially crippling liability present in mass tort litigation,

147. Allison, 151 F.3d at 422 n.17.
148. As noted above, this problem is illustrated starkly by cases such as Shores v. Publix
Super Markets, Inc., 69 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH), ¶ 44,477 (M.D. Fla. 1996), and Butler v.
Home Depot, Inc., 70 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 51 (N.D. Cal. 1996), in which courts certified portions of class actions while acknowledging that they did not know how to manage the
remainder of the case. The class process with all of its risk and expense was set in motion; yet,
it was by no means clear that the use of the class device was proper under the circumstances.
149. As the Rutstein court stated: “[T]here is nothing to be gained by certifying this case
as a class action . . . except the blackmail value of a class certification that can aid the plaintiffs
in coercing the defendant into a settlement.” Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d
1228, 1240 n.21 (11th Cir. 2000). See also In Re Matter of Rhone-Poulenc-Rorer, Inc., 51
F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir. 1995); Castano v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 746 (5th
Cir. 1996).
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the $300 million at stake in Allison is momentous, and, for any given
employer, the prospect of a multimillion dollar legal bill or a ninefigure damages exposure is surely an incentive to settle regardless of
the merits of the claims.150 Indeed, settlements of class actions for
millions, tens of millions, or hundreds of millions of dollars are becoming increasingly common151 and are increasingly accompanied by
employers’ public statements that it was less expensive to settle the
case than to litigate it with the attendant risks.152 Careful attention to
the requirements of Rule 23 and the Seventh Amendment is therefore desirable to police the class action scene and to protect against
abuses of class proceedings by plaintiffs and their lawyers.
VI. FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE?
Nearly ten years after the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
its implications are just beginning to be felt in the area of Title VII
class actions. While many lower courts have shown themselves willing to ignore or able to work around these implications, there is
every indication that as more of these cases reach the appellate level
more and more courts may adopt the kinds of restrictions recognized
in Allison. Thus, there is a real possibility that a law that was passed
in order to expand the relief available to individual victims of dis-

150. While it is probably impossible to quantify how many settled class actions have merit
and how many do not, statistics concerning individual discrimination suits may be informative.
Of the discrimination charges submitted to the mandatory pre-lawsuit administrative procedure before the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the agency in
fiscal 1999 found probable cause to believe that discrimination had occurred in only 5.7% of
charges. That was the highest rate in the last eight years, and “cause” findings have historically
been as low as 1.6%. See United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964: Changes FY 1992 – FY 1999 (visited Oct. 27, 2000)
<http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/vii.html>. Of the employment discrimination lawsuits disposed
of in federal court from October 1, 1998, through September 30, 1999, (both class actions
and non-class actions) approximately 80% were dismissed by the courts before trial, while only
5.8% were eventually tried. It is difficult to escape an inference that a huge number of meritless
cases are being brought, and there is no apparent reason why class actions should be any exception to the general rule.
151. In the author’s city of Atlanta, for example, the past two years have brought the filing of race discrimination class actions against the Coca-Cola Company (twice), Lockheed
Martin Corporation (one suit each on behalf of hourly and salaried employees), Waffle House
(a prominent restaurant chain), and Georgia Power Company (the principal local utility).
152. See Judge Approves $12.1 Million Settlement in Part-Time Workers’ Lawsuit Against
UPS, Daily Labor Report (BNA), April 14, 1999, at A-6; EEOC Says San Francisco Grocery
Chain Agreed to Settle Bias Claims for $1.3 Million, Daily Labor Report (BNA), Jan. 23, 1988,
at A-11.
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crimination may have the effect of restricting their ability to bring
claims on behalf of those similarly situated.
It is a different question whether this irony is a problem that demands a solution. There are sound reasons to tolerate a rule that limits the maintenance of Title VII class actions. The problem of the
“blackmail class” is not an academic one: the costs of such suits to
employers are enormous and are unrelated to whether or not they
have done anything wrong. Contrary to the Fifth Circuit’s optimistic
footnote in Allison, settlement of such cases often has nothing to do
with the merits of the claims and everything to do with the financial
and public relations risks presented by the overwhelming scale of
such actions. The limits placed on class actions by the 1991 Act may
in turn limit the ease with which corporations can be browbeaten by
an aggressive set of plaintiffs and their equally aggressive attorneys.
This is not necessarily bad news for the cause of individual rights.
While the 1991 Act may limit class actions, it arguably makes it easier for individual plaintiffs to get access to the courts. The availability
of damages and attorney’s fees provides incentives for plaintiffs’ lawyers to take such cases on a contingent-fee basis, which means that
plaintiffs can bring suit without spending their own money to do
so.153 In other words, employment discrimination suits are no longer
negative value suits. While this diminishes their suitability for class
treatment, it increases their odds of being brought individually,
which for the individual is an equivalent opportunity for justice.
Further, class actions are not necessary for certain types of wideranging relief. Insofar as plaintiffs seek to end discriminatory practices in the workplace, such results are possible in individual suits.
For example, a plaintiff who challenges a particular employment
practice on his own behalf may succeed in having it declared invalid,
to the benefit of both himself and all other current and future employees. Sweeping changes are therefore possible (though usually
only prospectively) in nonclass cases. Moreover, the EEOC may file
suit itself or intervene in a private suit to seek relief on behalf of others similarly situated to the plaintiff.154 When the EEOC seeks such
153. And they have done so in increasing numbers. See supra note 15.
154. The EEOC has stated publicly that it intends to become more active in the pursuit
of class-style claims. See EEOC: Expanded Mediation, More Class Actions in Agency’s Future,
Officials Tell ABA Meeting, Daily Labor Report (BNA), March 26, 1999, at C-1. It has also
taken an active role in the maintenance and settlement of several highly publicized class actions
in past few years. See Mitsubishi Settles EEOC Suit for $34 Million, Agency Says Class, Amount
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relief, even for a large class of persons, it is not required to satisfy the
provisions of Rule 23 with its attendant constraints.155 Finally, in
multiplaintiff cases, various efficiencies can be achieved through the
use of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42, which permits the severance and consolidation of individual claims. While such plaintiffs
could not represent others, they still could bring aggregated claims
that could be dealt with on a mass scale and could result in equitable
relief that would benefit similarly situated employees. All of this
means that the constraints imposed on Title VII class actions by the
law and the civil rules are entirely compatible with a balancing of the
interests of employees and employers as participants in the federal
antidiscrimination scheme. It also means that Title VII class actions
might not be missed as much as one might think should the 1991
Act render them unsustainable in many cases, as seems likely.156
Because the trend, at least at the appellate level, is toward restricting Title VII class actions, it becomes a political question
whether those restrictions should be eased or lifted. If Congress
wanted to encourage or facilitate Title VII class actions, most, if not
all, of the barriers to class certification could be obviated if the damages portions of the 1991 Act were modified or repealed. Many federal employment discrimination statutes lack a punitive or compensatory damages provision, or both. If only liquidated damages were
available under Title VII (based, for instance, on a multiple of back
pay or simply on a sliding scale like the damages caps already in
place), then the individualized damages that make class certifications
problematic would be significantly streamlined. This would not alleviate the Seventh Amendment problem in large cases involving multiple juries. Nonetheless, it would be a step toward minimizing Seventh Amendment issues, leaving more room for waivers and other
devices that might facilitate a constitutional resolution of the issues.

Largest Ever, Daily Labor Report (BNA), June 12, 1998, at AA-1; Publix Markets Agrees to
Pay $81.5 Million to Settle Sex Bias Suit, Daily Labor Report (BNA), Jan. 27. 1997, at AA-1;
EEOC, Texaco Settle Bias Charges with Plan for Monitoring Promotions, Daily Labor Report
(BNA), Jan. 6. 1997, at AA-1.
155. See General Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318 (1980).
156. For a contrary view, see Harvey S. Bartlett III, Determining Whether a Title VII
Plaintiff Class’s “Aim Is True”: The Legacy of Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp. for Employment
Discrimination Class Certification Under Rule 23(b)(2), 74 TUL. L. REV. 2163 (2000).
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VII. CONCLUSION

The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has raised complex questions in the
field of Title VII class actions, and it will likely take years, if not decades, before these issues are fully resolved. Until they are, or until
Congress takes action to counter the apparent trend, these types of
cases appear to be on their way to becoming significantly curtailed,
at least where individual money damages are sought. Whether these
developments will slow the filing and settlement of such cases only
time will tell, but litigants who wish to bring or oppose such cases
can no longer afford to ignore the implications of the 1991 remedies
for class litigation.
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